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LAWYER DISCIPLINE: CONSCIENTIOUS
NONCOMPLIANCE, CONSCIOUS
AVOIDANCE, AND PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION
Bruce A. Green*
A lawyer is retained on a contingency-fee basis to represent a
Eyoung man who was struck by a car. Because of the seriousness
of the injury, the client's left leg is amputated, he is hospitalized for
almost four weeks, and his hospital and medical expenses soar. The
client lacks funds to pay for a prosthesis and other medical expenses.
Nor can he afford a wheelchair-accessible house, rather than the
trailer that he has been renting. It is clear that the client will eventu-
ally receive a substantial recovery. Until then, however, he is finan-
cially distressed. The lawyer knows that he is forbidden from
advancing funds to the client by a disciplinary rule which provides that
"[a] lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connec-
tion with pending or contemplated litigation."' Nevertheless, driven
by religious conviction, the lawyer provides funds to pay for the cli-
ent's medical and living expenses.2
How should disciplinary authorities respond? Professor Leslie
Griffin identifies two alternative models: exemption and civil disobe-
dience/conscientious objection.3 She favors the latter-the model in
which the lawyer would openly defy the rule, publicly state his reasons
* Louis Stein Professor, Fordham University School of Law; Director, Louis
Stein Center for Law and Ethics.
1. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(e) (1995) [hereinafter -ABA
Model Rules"]. To like effect is Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-
103(B) (1980) [hereinafter "ABA Model Code"]. See generally Deborah L Rhode,
Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 665, 722-24 (1994) (arguing for
lesser restrictions on lawyer-financed litigation); Note, Fee Simple: A Proposal to
Adopt a Twvo-Way Fee Shift for Low-Income Litigants, 101 Harv. L Rev. 1231 (1988)
(advocating a system where the losing litigant's attorney pays the winning litigant's
attorneys' fees).
A proposal was made to include a provision in the Restatement permitting lawyers
to advance funds to clients in cases of financial hardship. That proposal, however, was
rejected. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 48(2) (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
2. This scenario is loosely based on Mississippi Bar v. Attorney HH, 671 So. 2d
1293 (Miss. 1995), where a lawyer's advance of funds to a client in a personal injury
case resulted in a private reprimand, over the objection of several dissenting judges
who believed that the conduct should have been deemed permissible.
3. She explains:
In an exemption model .... the profession would exempt religious believ-
ers from disciplinary proceedings, fines, suspension, or disbarment, when
lawyers in good faith disagree with the profession's standards. In a civil dis-
obedience model, the penalty is not suspended. The individual attorney
breaks the law and can state publicly the reasons for her (mis)conduct or
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for doing so, and accept the penalty-because of the problems posed
by exempting religious lawyers from otherwise applicable rules of con-
duct.4 These problems include the difficulty of defining "religion" and
determining the legitimacy of a claim that the lawyer's conduct was
religiously compelled, as well as the concern that recognizing religious
exemptions would discourage compliance by those to whom the rule
would still apply.5
Several years ago, a disciplinary counsel suggested an alternative
model. As a principal speaker in a program for lawyers on how to
avoid disciplinary problems and malpractice claims, he gave practical
advice based on his experience investigating complaints about local
lawyers, deciding which cases deserved to be prosecuted, and bringing
formal disciplinary prosecutions. After his speech, a lawyer in the au-
dience described a very sympathetic situation in which he felt driven
to provide assistance to a financially distressed client, despite the rule
forbidding him from doing so. The disciplinary counsel's response
was, in substance, "Give him the money. Just don't tell us about it."6
The recommended conduct seems somewhat different from "consci-
entious objection" or "civil disobedience," as exemplified by Monroe
Freedman's public defiance of the disciplinary rules on advertising
and solicitation, to which Professor Griffin refers.7 It is not intended
to call attention to a misguided rule in an effort to change or overturn
it. It is not conscientious objection so much as conscientious noncom-
pliance-an act of conscience, but not of open defiance.'
The disciplinary counsel's effort to discourage the lawyer from call-
ing attention to his conduct might be characterized as "conscious
explain why the norms are wrong or inconsistent with her religious beliefs,
then accepts whatever penalty the disciplinary committee assesses.
Leslie Griffin, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: Legal Ethics, 66 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 1253, 1259-60 (1998) (footnote omitted).
4. Id. at 1260.
5. Id. at 1260-61.
6. I suspect that noncompliance with this particular disciplinary rule, privately
and as a matter of conscience, is common. A former poverty lawyer recently de-
scribed to me how he arranged to reimburse a friend in another city who would in
turn provide needed funds to an impoverished client, all in an effort to avoid discov-
ery of what the lawyer believed to be morally compelled, but unlawful conduct. I
understand that a professor in a clinical law program teaches his students that, in this
situation, the lawyer should find a way to get away with doing what conscience re-
quires. Some time ago, while staffing an ethics hotline, I fielded a call involving an-
other variation on this theme and found it hard to resist giving similar advice.
7. Id. at 1260 n.17 (citing Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics from a Jewish Per-
spective, 27 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1131, 1137 (1996)).
8. Maura Strassberg refers to such conduct as "secret ethical disobedience."
Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal
Ethics, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 901, 951 (1995). Her article addresses the constraints that a
positivist view of the legal ethics rules imposes on lawyers seeking to engage in moral
conduct, id. at 926, and argues that lawyers and courts should adopt a "Dworkonian
interpretive approach," id. at 951, that would generally accommodate morally justi-
fied conduct. Id. at 937-49.
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avoidance." 9 Ordinarily, the disciplinary counsel's job is to ferret out
evidence of lawyer wrongdoing. He is assisted in doing so by a disci-
plinary rule that requires lawyers in some circumstances to report
other lawyers' misconduct.10 On this occasion, however, the strategy
was to avoid learning of a possible disciplinary violation in order to
avoid having to decide whether to initiate disciplinary proceedings.
If this disciplinary counsel were to learn (despite his best efforts to
avoid doing so) that a lawyer had privately provided financial assist-
ance to a needy client out of religious conviction, he might decline to
institute a disciplinary proceeding. That the act had occurred pri-
vately would make it somewhat easier to do so. This would be differ-
ent from "exempting" the conscientious lawyer because there would
be no official, public determination that the lawyer was excused from
complying with the rule and had acted lawfully by virtue of his reli-
gious and/or moral convictions. This would simply be an act of
"prosecutorial discretion."
Would it be an abuse of discretion? It might be argued that, regard-
less of the lawyer's motive for violating the rule, the rule should not
apply in this situation. The rule was designed to prevent a conflict of
interest that might result when the lawyer expects to be repaid out of
the proceeds of the litigation," as well as to prevent lawyers from
soliciting clients by offering them money. -12 These concerns are not
strongly implicated, however, when, midway through the representa-
tion, a lawyer who already has a financial stake, because he represents
the client for a contingent fee, advances funds to meet the financially
strapped client's emergency needs. Yet, the courts do not necessarily
see it that way. Perhaps out of a desire to preserve a clear line be-
tween what is and is not permissible, some courts have sanctioned
lawyers for providing such financial assistance, 3 notwithstanding the
9. In criminal cases, "conscious avoidance" refers to ignoring one's suspicions
and consciously avoiding the truth about wrongdoing. Conscious avoidance is
equivalent to knowledge of such wrongdoing for purposes of criminal statutes requir-
ing proof of guilty "knowledge." See, eg., United States v. Wilson, Nos. 96-1989,96-
1990, 96-2024, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 734, at *35 (7th Cir. Jan. 20, 1998).
10. See ABA Model Code, supra note 1, DR 1-103(A); ABA Model Rules, supra
note 1, Rule 8.3(a).
11. Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 507 (1986).
The basic concern [of the rule] is with the conflict of interest created when a
lawyer, who is supposed to take direction solely from the client on important
decisions in the representation[ ], has a personal interest in the outcome that
is created by the hope of repayment of advances for the client's benefit.
Id.
12. Id. (noting that, additionally, the rule is "concerned with the risk that the
promise of money advances would be employed by some lawyers to solicit clients").
13. See Mississippi Bar v. Attorney HH, 671 So. 2d 1293, 1295 (Miss. 1995) (citing
cases holding that a lawyer's advancement of personal living expenses to his client
violates the Rules of Professional Conduct); see also Annotated Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct 130-31 (3d ed. 1996) (citing cases holding it improper for a lawyer
to advance money to a client while litigation is pending); Wolfram, supra note 11, at
1998] 1309
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objection that this "puts an attorney in the untenable position of hav-
ing to choose between doing what is morally proper and what is 'ethi-
cally' correct pursuant to [the disciplinary rule]." 14
In states in which courts view it as sanctionable misconduct for a
lawyer to advance funds to a needy client during litigation, one might
expect a disciplinary counsel to bring charges against lawyers who are
discovered to have done so, at least when the lawyers acted merely
out of indifference to, or ignorance of, the rule.15 If so, may the disci-
plinary counsel refrain from bringing charges against the lawyer who
acts out of conscience or religious conviction?
In the criminal context, there is no evidence that prosecutors favor
religious or conscientious lawbreakers over others.' 6 It is easy to un-
derstand why. Compliance with the law, even by those who object for
reasons of religious or moral conviction, is considered important to a
civilized society. Should the principles governing prosecutorial discre-
tion in the disciplinary context be different? 17
Reasons why a disciplinary prosecutor might be more disposed than
a criminal prosecutor to overlook lawbreaking that can be ascribed to
the lawyer's conscience are not necessarily persuasive. One possibility
is that, as Professor Griffin observes, "the law of lawyering ... is dif-
ferent from other areas of the law,"' 8 including criminal law, in that
"its standards are determined by the self-interest of the lawyers who
507-09 & nn.88, 89 (same). But see Florida Bar v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1994)
(finding that it was not unethical to give a client used clothing for her child and $200
for basic necessities without an expectation of repayment); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n
v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437, 445 (La. 1976) (noting that a lawyer who advances minor
sums of money to a client to meet minimal living and medical expenses does not
violate the spirit of the disciplinary rules).
14. Mississippi Bar v. Attorney HH, 671 So. 2d at 1299 (MacRae, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
15. In states where the scope of the applicable rule is unclear, disciplinary authori-
ties might reasonably decline to bring charges on either of two grounds. First, they
may conclude that an interpretation of the rule to allow this conduct is the preferable
one or the one most likely to be adopted by the courts. Alternatively, they may con-
clude that this is a plausible interpretation and that a lawyer should not be sanctioned
for acting in accordance with a plausible, albeit erroneous, interpretation of the disci-
plinary rule.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (find-
ing defendants not guilty of criminal contempt for violating an order enjoining them
from obstructing access to an abortion clinic where it is undisputed that they "acted
out of a sense of conscience and sincere religious conviction").
17. For discussions of prosecutorial discretion in the disciplinary context, see
Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too
Little Enforcement?, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 69, 88-91 (1995); Bruce A. Green, Whose
Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How
Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 460, 521-22 (1996); David B.
Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 799, 805-06 (1992); and
ABA Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Report to the House
of Delegates (1991).
18. Griffin, supra note 3, at 1273-74.
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write and enforce the rules." 19 But it does not follow, from the disci-
plinary authorities' perspective, that lawyers may therefore violate the
law of lawyering as an alternative to working to improve it.20 Another
possible reason to treat lawyers differently is that, as David Luban and
Michael Millemann recently argued, lawyers should be encouraged to
exercise moral judgment." But it does not follow that lawyers should
be encouraged to exercise moral judgment not only about how to act
within the confines of the disciplinary rules, but also about whether to
comply with the rules in the first place. Given lawyers' particular duty
"to encourage respect for the law,"' it might seem anomalous to al-
low lawyers to opt out of the particular rules of professional conduct
that they find offensive on religious or moral grounds.'
Furthermore, the extent of disciplinary prosecutors' discretion may
be especially limited because they lack the independence of criminal
prosecutors. Disciplinary prosecutors are an arm of the court and
might therefore be expected to exercise prosecutorial discretion in ac-
cordance with the court's expectations. And, perhaps for the reasons
identified by Professor Griffin, courts notably have not been inclined
to exempt lawyers from disciplinary rules on religious or moral
grounds. As one state supreme court observed several years ago
when it sanctioned a lawyer for deliberately defying a court order:
The lawyer "is certainly free to disagree and maintain ... his personal
view of what some higher law provides. It is, however, the decision of
the mortal judges ... which [he] must obey. 2 4
19. Id. at 1274.
20. See generally ABA Model Code, supra note 1. Canon 8 ("A Lawyer Should
Assist in Improving the Legal System"); id. EC 8-1, EC 8-7 (asserting that lawyers
should help establish standards of conduct and should abide by those standards).
21. David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark
Tunes, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 31 (1995).
22. ABA Model Code, supra note 1. EC 9-6; ABA Model Rules, supra note 1,
Preamble; see also ABA Model Code, supra note 1, Preamble (recognizing that -[t]he
continued existence of a free and democratic society depends upon recognition of the
concept that justice is based upon the rule of law").
23. See In re Krogh, 536 P.2d 578, 590 (Wash. 1975) (disbarring a member of Presi-
dent Nixon's staff who authorized the break-in to Daniel Ellsberg's office). The court
stated:
A person may be of the highest character and yet not be a proper person to
practice in the profession of law. The reason for this, of course, is that the
lawyer dedicates himself to a system of values which imposes upon him the
duty of knowing, understanding and supporting the constitution and laws of
the land. Those laws may contain many provisions which are offensive to
him, but he accepts the premise that change must come through the orderly
processes provided in the constitution and the statutes.
If he does not accept and dedicate himself to this commitment and rather
places... his convictions above the law and flaunts it in the excess of his
zeal, he does a great disservice to that which he has sworn to serve-the
constitution and the rule of law.
Id. at 588.
24. Florida Bar v. Rubin, 549 So. 2d 1000, 1002-03 (Fla. 1989) (quoting Rubin v.
State, 490 So. 2d 1001, 1003 (Fla. 1986)).
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Even if it would be an "abuse of discretion" for this disciplinary
counsel to decline to prosecute the lawyer who provided financial
assistance to a client as an act of conscience, it might be morally
proper for him to do so. Like other lawyers, a prosecutor may feel
compelled to act out of conscience. The disciplinary counsel might say
to himself, "If I had been in the same position, I would have provided
assistance to this client, because my own conscience would have dic-
tated doing so." Or he might say, "Whether or not I would have done
the same, I can understand how the lawyer may have felt morally
compelled to act in violation of the rule." In either case, the prosecu-
tor may reason, "This lawyer does not deserve to be punished. Re-
gardless of how the judges who oversee my office expect me to act, I
will not institute proceedings against him." Of course, the judges
might well be of the view, "Ignore the violation. Just don't tell us
about it."
